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Are ‘Coalitions of the Willing’ Moral Agents? 
 
 
In “Coalitions of the Willing and Responsibilities to Protect: Informal Associations, 
Enhanced Capacities, and Shared Moral Burdens,” Toni Erskine argues that ‘coalitions of the 
willing’(CWs) lack moral agency, and are therefore ineligible for obligation, blame, and 
punishment.  
I disagree. Here is an example. Suppose the United States, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey 
formed a coalition to intervene militarily in Syria, and the coalition partners needed to reach a 
consensus on which officer would lead operations. Imagine the following preferences: 
 
 United States  
 
Saudi Arabia Turkey 
First preference Gen. Washington 
 
Gen. Riyadh Gen. Ankara 
Second preference Gen. Texas 
 
Gen. Texas Gen. Texas 
Third preference 
 
Gen. Riyadh or Gen. 
Ankara 
Gen. Washington 
or Gen. Ankara 
Gen. Washington 
or Gen. Riyadh 
 
Negotiations occur and reasons are given. No party changes their preferences, but consensus 
is needed. So each partner begrudgingly compromises. The coalition agrees Gen. Texas will 
be in charge. Unfortunately, he gives poorly thought-through orders, resulting in numerous 
combatant and non-combatant deaths.  
 Where do we place blame? Obviously, some blame belongs with Gen. Texas himself. 
Additionally, though, the three states put Gen. Texas in charge and (suppose) his conduct was 
reasonably foreseeable. However, it was not the three individual states, taken separately, that 
put him in charge—it was the three states together. Each state can truthfully say “I would 
have preferred Gen. Washington / Riyadh / Ankara. If I had decided, Gen. Texas would not 
have led operations. Unfortunately, I did not decide. The group did. I compromised to 
achieve group consensus. Given the others’ positions, it was clearly either Gen. Texas or 
nothing.” It seems it is only by viewing the three states as a group—and as making decisions 
as a group—that we can make sense of the decision to appoint Gen. Texas. A natural 
assessment is that the coalition made the decision, and is to blame for it. 
This assessment has implications for our assessment of appropriate punishment. 
Punishing the coalition itself might mean reforming or dismantling the coalition, or ‘naming 
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and shaming’ the coalition in its own right. But punishing the coalition’s members—all 
Erskine could require—would mean something different: naming and shaming the individual 
states, say. The latter, state-targeted punishments would be inappropriate, given the extent to 
which the agency of members was constrained by the need for the coalition to form a unified 
decision. This thought experiment suggests that viewing CWs as moral agents allows us to 
make sense of their decisions, their blame, and their punishments. 
Why, then, does Erskine deny CWs group agency (and thus group blame and 
punishment)? There are five conditions at play, each of which Erskine believes is necessary 
for group agency. According to Erskine, CWs fail to meet four of the five conditions. Each of 
these four assessments hinges on her judgment that CWs have merely an “informal 
organizational structure and deliberative capacity” (p. 138), which “involves negotiation, 
bargaining, and consensus-building among the various constituents in the absence of existing 
organizational structures and decision-making procedures” and “the inability to translate calls 
for collective action into decisions that are binding upon the group as a whole if such 
proposals depart from the positions of some of its members” (p. 123).  
 There are several ideas at play here. I have just suggested that CWs can make 
decisions that “depart from the positions of some of its members”: if the appointment of Gen. 
Texas isn’t such a decision, I am not sure what is. Perhaps, then, the issue is that CW partners 
aren’t bound by these group decisions. If ‘bound’ means ‘legally required to abide,’ then it is 
true that CW partners are unbound. True, but unhelpful: our aim in giving an account of 
collective moral agency in international relations should be to ultimately guide the law; to 
instruct the law on which agents can coherently be held to account and which cannot. If we 
ultimately defer to the law on this question, then the law can hold to account whoever it likes. 
On the other hand, if ‘bound’ means ‘committed to abide,’ then CW partners are as 
committed as we can reasonably expect any member of any group agent to be (which is to 
say, fairly robustly committed, but not entirely unconditionally committed). The 
unboundedness of members is not the problem. 
 Erskine’s dispute, rather, lies with the way in which our hypothetical coalition’s 
group-level decision was reached: it was reached by “informal,” rather than “formal,” means. 
Erskine does not provide distinguishing features between formal and informal decision-
making.
1
 One possible feature is functionality: perhaps formal mechanisms are such that from 
the same inputs, one always gets the same output. Negotiation isn’t a ‘function’ in this sense: 
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the outcomes of the same negotiation mechanism might vary across cases, even if the 
mechanism has the same inputs (initial individual opinions) each time. Yet if something as 
strict as functionality is required for a decision-making entity to have agency, then it looks 
doubtful that states are agents. The precise wording of states’ laws cannot be predicted 
simply by knowing what each legislator prefers the wording to be. These facts 
underdetermine the law’s wording, since the mechanisms for moving from legislators’ 
preferences to legislature decisions are insufficiently fine-grained in states. In fact, many 
states’ decisions are made by negotiation, just as CWs’ are. Yet Erskine insists states do have 
agency-conferring decision-making apparatuses (p. 120).  
I suggest, then, that we should agree that group decision-making procedures are 
crucial to group agency, but be more permissive than Erskine about how “formal” these 
procedures need to be.
2
 This would have the upshot that states and (at least some) CWs have 
agency, including our hypothetical Syria coalition. To deny that we can “coherently talk 
about assigning duties or apportioning blame to the coalition itself” (p. 125) is to afford 
ourselves an unduly limiting picture of the moral world. 
  
                                                 
1
 On “informal” decision-making, Erskine points us to Thomas Christiansen and Christine 
Neuhold, eds., International Handbook on Informal Governance (Cheltenham, UK: Edward 
Elgar), but the contributors to this volume use numerous and varied conceptions of 
“informal,” as the volume’s editors note (Christiansen and Neuhold, “Introduction,” in 
International Handbook on Informal Governance, p. 3). 
2
 I give a more precise proposal in “Collectives’ Duties and Collectivization Duties,” 
Australian Journal of Philosophy  91 (2013), pp. 213–48, at pp. 234–238. 
